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Abstract
The rising earnings inequality in China has sparked a heated debate on the socioeconomic out-
comes of market transformation. While a large body of literature has focussed on the temporal
trend of wage inequality during the reform period, much less attention has been devoted to the
structural causes of regional variations in sectoral wage differentials. Using a micro-data sample
from the 2005 one percent population sample survey and multilevel methods, this article exam-
ines the geographic variability of wage differentials between economic sectors in urban China,
with a particular focus on the combination effects of market expansion and state intervention.
The results indicate that sectoral wage differentials vary substantially across regions, and that mar-
ket expansion interacts with state intervention to reconfigure earnings outcomes. Specifically,
prefectures located in the interior region tend to exhibit a large wage premium for the state sec-
tors, while prefectures located in the coastal region tend to display a wage advantage of the
foreign-invested sector. The wage gap between the state and non-state sectors is smaller in areas
with diversified ownership; openness to foreign investment increases the relative wages of
foreign-invested-sector employees; stringent government regulation of industries increases the
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wage gap between the state monopoly sector and the non-monopoly sector; and strong redistri-
butive power increases the wage premium for the public service sector over other sectors. Our
findings suggest the necessity to take into account contextually constituted and locally specific
wage-setting mechanisms when studying China’s wage inequality.
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Introduction
Earnings inequality in China has grown dra-
matically since the early 1990s when eco-
nomic reforms were deepened (Li and
Sicular, 2014; Poon and Shang, 2012; Xie
and Zhou, 2014; Zhang and Bao, 2015). The
rising earnings inequality in China has
sparked a heated debate on theorising mar-
ket transition from a socialist planned econ-
omy. For example, in his market transition
theory, Nee (1989) argued that markets
replace redistributive mechanisms in the dis-
tribution of resources during China’s eco-
nomic reform and asserted that economic
success is more closely related to human
capital rather than political capital. Such
theory has, however, drawn many criticisms.
For example, some researchers attributed
the increase in returns to human capital to
economic development rather than to mar-
ket transition (Hauser and Xie, 2005; Xie
and Hannum, 1996), while other scholars
argued that political power and positional
power persisted in determining income in
the course of economic transformation
(Walder, 2002; Zhou, 2000).
Although a large body of research has
examined earnings inequality in relation to
economic transformation in China, our
understanding of this issue is constrained by
limitations in previous research. First, while
a large body of literature has examined the
wage gap between the state and non-state
sectors (the effect of ownership segmentation)
(to name a few, Chen et al., 2005; De´murger
et al., 2012; Meng, 2012), very few scholars
have tried to measure the wage premium for
the monopoly sectors over the non-
monopoly sectors (the effect of administra-
tive monopoly). In fact, the state sector in
China has been divided into two segments
since the early 1990s: a state monopoly sector
in which state-owned enterprises reap exces-
sive profits through scale economies, price
manipulation and administrative protection
and a state non-monopoly sector in which
state-owned enterprises make relatively low
profits due to fierce market competition
(Bian and Zhang, 2002). Therefore, a novel
approach is needed to differentiate between
monopoly and non-monopoly sectors in
China.
Second, while most previous studies have
focussed on the temporal trend of wage
inequality during China’s reform, only a few
studies have been undertaken to explain the
causes of geographical variability of earn-
ings inequality (Bian and Zhang, 2002;
Hauser and Xie, 2005; Nee and Cao, 2005;
Shu et al., 2007; Xie and Hannum, 1996).
However, most of these studies have merely
focussed on the process of market expan-
sion, devoting insufficient attention to the
concurring process of state transformation.
The state’s regulation of the economy is geo-
graphically specific and socially embedded
(Hu and Lin, 2011; Wei, 2007). Although
some scholars have found substantial
regional variations in the state’s regulation
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of industrial mix and land conveyance in
China (He et al., 2007; Lin and Hu, 2011;
Liu and Lin, 2014), little empirical research
has been done to quantitatively measure
how state transformation along with market
expansion reconfigure employment out-
comes within a particular region.
Third, most previous studies on wage
inequality across sectors are primarily based
on survey data collected at a limited number
of sampled cities (Bian and Zhang, 2002;
Nee and Cao, 2005). For example, Bian and
Zhang (2002) and Nee and Cao (2005) capi-
talised on 1995 Chinese Household Income
Project (CHIP) survey data, which were
drawn from around 55 municipalities and
counties located in 11 out of China’s 31
provinces. It is necessary to investigate this
issue with a more geographically diverse
database, because China’s labour markets
differ substantially across regions (Hauser
and Xie, 2005; Meng, 2012).
To fill these research gaps, the present
article investigates the geographic variability
in wage differentials among economic sec-
tors in urban China, using a micro-data
sample from the 2005 one percent popula-
tion sample survey (hereafter, 2005 Survey)
and multilevel models. It particularly focuses
on how regional variations in market expan-
sion and state intervention matter in shaping
sectoral wage differentials across 320
prefecture-level units (hereafter, prefectures).
It contributes to the existing literature in the
following ways. First, different from previ-
ous research on wage differentials between
the public and private sectors, this study
provides a more nuanced and accurate
account of wage inequality by considering
simultaneously the effects of both ownership
segmentation and administrative monopoly.
Second, this study goes beyond earlier strati-
fication studies that merely focus on the
effect of market expansion. On the contrary,
following Zhou’s (2000) ‘market-politics
coevolution model’ and Bian and Zhang’s
(2002) ‘market-state interaction view’, this
study examines how market expansion inter-
acts with state intervention to structure
earnings outcomes in a spatially specific
manner. Furthermore, this study covers 320
out of China’s 340 prefectures in 2005,
therefore providing a more comprehensive
and thorough picture of wage inequality
across economic sectors.
The rest of this article is organised as fol-
lows. The next section reviews previous liter-
ature on the market transition debate in
China. The section after that presents the
research hypotheses of this study based on
our understanding of the geographic varia-
bility of sectoral wage differentials. This is
followed by a section introducing the data
and models used in this study and visualising
the spatial patterns of sectoral wage differ-
entials in China. We then present the results
of multilevel models on the mechanisms of
the geographic variability of sectoral wage
differentials, before summarising the main
findings of the article and drawing attention
to its more general significance.
Economic transformation and
earnings inequality
Market transition theory is among the most
famous but controversial theories on the
impact of China’s market reforms on socioe-
conomic attainment (Nee, 1989). This the-
ory asserts that market reform shifts the
mode of distributing resources from a redis-
tributive system to a market-oriented sys-
tem, and such shift benefits direct producers
rather than redistributors. This theory also
suggests that the Chinese reform undermines
the value of political capital and increases
the importance of human capital in income
determination. Market transition theory is
supported by the following findings in post-
reform China (Cao and Nee, 2000): first,
returns to human capital have increased
substantially over time; second, the
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advantage of redistributors possessing redis-
tributive power has declined relative to that
of economic actors possessing market power;
third, new opportunities have emerged out-
side the state redistributive economy. Thus,
socioeconomic transformation in China is
argued to be accompanied by the rising
importance of human capital and entrepre-
neurship, the expansion of private/hybrid
sectors and the declining significance of
redistributive power and political capital.
Market transition theory has triggered a
lively debate about the socioeconomic
impact of China’s economic transformation.
Many researchers challenged the validity of
the theory at theoretical and conceptual lev-
els. In his ‘market-politics coevolution model’,
Zhou (2000) argued that the expansion of the
market was not a self-evolving process.
Rather, both politics and markets coevolved
in response to each other during China’s
socioeconomic transformation. For one thing,
economic activities in the marketplace are
shaped by polities, as many economic entities
expand with the help of and under the rule of
political authorities in China. For another,
the expansion of non-state sectors contributes
to the increase in state revenue, which
encourages government agencies to change
their role from redistributors to regulators
and adopt policies to promote market expan-
sion (Zhou, 2000). Under such circumstances,
it is not only the case that returns to educa-
tion increase in the reform era, but also that
returns to positional power and organisa-
tional hierarchy persist over time.
Using a ‘market-state interaction perspec-
tive’, Bian and Zhang (2002) treated Chinese
economic transition as an interactive process
of market growth and state transformation.
They set out two features of the market-state
interactive process: first, marketisation is ‘a
multifaceted and historical process in which
product, labour, and capital markets grow
through different historical trajectories’; sec-
ond, state transformation occurs along with
marketisation, which is reflected in ‘the role
transformation from a redistributive state to
a regulative state, in the formation of a state
monopoly sector and in the conversion of
state properties to cadres’ control and
income rights through an insider privatiza-
tion’ (Bian and Zhang, 2002: 399). This
market-state interactive process leads to the
growth in earnings inequality in China by
increasing economic returns to both posi-
tional power and human capital (Bian and
Zhang, 2002).
In this study, we adopt Zhou’s (2000) ‘mar-
ket-politics coevolution model’ and Bian and
Zhang’s (2002) ‘market-state interaction per-
spective’ in the analysis of wage inequality in
urban China, since both of these two theories
reflect the reality of the Chinese labour market:
market expansion is not necessarily accompa-
nied by the retrenchment of the state, and mar-
ket transformation benefits not only market-
oriented sectors but also state monopoly sec-
tors. Conceptually, we treat market expansion
and state transformation as two interrelated
and interactive processes; empirically, we mea-
sure the magnitude of market expansion and
state intervention with two sets of indicators.
Contrary to what is articulated in Nee’s (1989)
market transition theory, the state evolves in
response to and facilitates market expansion,
and in return its role in market economies is
reinforced due to a growing economy (Bian
and Zhang, 2002; Zhou, 2000). Therefore, it is
necessary to use more sophisticated and com-
prehensive measures to quantify the multifa-
ceted process of market transformation.
Understanding the geographic
variability of sectoral wage
differentials
In this study, we focus on how the geo-
graphic variability of sectoral wage differen-
tials is influenced by the multifaceted process
of market transformation. Historical evi-
dence shows that, between the early 1980s
4 Urban Studies
 at University of St Andrews on August 30, 2016usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
and the mid-1990s, market expansion is
accompanied by a substantial increase in the
relative wages of non-state-sector employees,
as non-state companies are more profitable
in the market and have more freedom to con-
vert business profits into wages (Zhou, 2000).
From a geographical perspective, the non-
state economy is assumed to be more competi-
tive and vital in areas with high degrees
of marketisation and economic openness,
because non-state enterprises enjoy more busi-
ness opportunities and favorable institutional
settings in these areas. This is exemplified by
the fact that the non-state sector thrives in
coastal China while growing relatively slowly
in central and western China (Fan et al., 2010;
Lin and Hu, 2011; Wei, 2004). As workers’
wages are closely linked to the profitability
and competitiveness of their work units (Chen
et al., 2011; Xie and Wu, 2008), we can sug-
gest the following working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The wages of non-state-sector
employees relative to state-sector employees
are higher in areas with a higher level of mar-
ket expansion.
In response to the rapid expansion of the
market, the state has substantially changed
its administrative functions from ‘direct
intervention’ (through centralised planning
and party and government organs, etc.) to
‘indirect regulation and control’ (through
central banks, taxation and market regula-
tions, etc.) (Bian and Zhang, 2002;
Naughton, 2006). Rather than imposing
entire control over the economy, the state
has allowed private and foreign investors to
enter a selected set of industries such as com-
merce, service, construction and manufac-
turing while maintaining strict control over
industries strategically vital to the national
economy and security such as banking,
petroleum, energy, railway transportation
and telecommunication (Naughton, 2006).
Consequently, China’s industries become
divided into two sectors: a state monopoly
sector with high entry barriers and low mar-
ket competition and a non-monopoly sector
with a diversified ownership and a large
number of competitors. Some studies have
shown that a substantial wage gap exists
between the state monopoly sector and the
non-monopoly sector, because state mono-
polistic enterprises make excessive profits
through scale economies, price manipulation
and generous supports from the banking sys-
tem (Bian and Zhang, 2002; Yue et al.,
2011).
The wage premium in the state monopoly
sector is assumed to vary across different
regional and institutional contexts. Some
geographers have indicated that ownership
transformation in China exhibits multiple
forms and local trajectories, and that state-
firm relationships are different in different
places (Hu and Lin, 2011, 2013; Wei, 2004,
2007). For example, where local govern-
ments rely on large-scale state-owned enter-
prises within their jurisdictions to achieve
their economic and political objectives, the
state monopoly sector tends to receive more
administrative protections, subsidies and
privileges from the governments (Hu and
Lin, 2011, 2013). Therefore, in these areas,
the workers of the state monopoly sector are
more likely to earn more than their counter-
parts in the non-monopoly sector. This is
verified by Poon and Shang (2012)’s finding
that the mining and energy industries in cen-
tral and western provinces, which are domi-
nated by state-owned enterprises, pay their
workers higher wages than other industries.
By contrast, where the state influences the
local economy primarily through indirect
means, the wage premium of state-mono-
poly-sector workers over non-monopoly-
sector workers is supposed to be lower. This
leads to our second working hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The wage premium in the state
monopoly sector over non-monopoly sectors is
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higher in areas with a more stringent govern-
ment regulation of industries.
Wage-setting mechanisms are assumed to
differ between the public service sector and
other economic sectors. For government
civil servants and tenured employees of not-
for-profit public service units (e.g. public
school teachers), their wages are closely
related to the fiscal capacity of local govern-
ments (Chan and Ma, 2011). Some scholars
have indicated that, with the rise of extra-
budgetary activities and the commercialisa-
tion of the public sector, workers’ earnings
in for-profit public service units become
increasingly dependent on their work units’
ability to generate revenues rather than on
the allocation of budgetary funds (Wong,
2009; Xie and Wu, 2008). Nevertheless, in
general, labour remuneration in the public
service sector is more subject to redistribu-
tion in the form of government spending,
while that in both monopoly and non-
monopoly sectors is more determined by
market mechanisms (Chan and Ma, 2011;
De´murger et al., 2012). By the same token,
the wage premium in the public service sector
over other sectors is hypothesised to vary by
the redistributive power of the government:
Hypothesis 3: The wage premium in the pub-
lic service sector over other sectors is higher
in areas with stronger redistributive power.
Data and methodology
Overview of the data
The data used in our analysis were extracted
from the 2005 Survey. The 2005 Survey was
carried out by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China using a stratified, cluster
and Probability Proportional to Size (PPS)
sampling technique. The dataset of the 2005
Survey includes 2,585,481 observations. We
only considered individuals aged 15–65 who
lived in urban areas, who were engaged in
non-agricultural occupations and who
earned between CNY 1 and CNY 100 per
hour through employment. We excluded
employers and self-employed individuals
from our sample, as their earnings determi-
nation mechanism might be different from
that of employees (Parks, 2012). It should be
noted that rural migrants who lived and
worked in cities were considered in our anal-
ysis as well. We further restricted the sample
to 320 out of 340 prefectures in China,
excluding prefectures with a very small sam-
ple size.
Two indicators, the ownership type and
the industrial sector of a wage earner’s work
unit, were used to distinguish among sectors.
With regard to the ownership type, the state
sector and non-state sector were distin-
guished. While the state sector comprises
government/party agencies, state-run public
service units and state-owned enterprises
(including enterprises in which the state
holds the controlling share), the non-state
sector includes collectively owned enter-
prises, domestic privately owned enterprises,
individual/household enterprises, foreign-
invested enterprises and other types of non-
state-owned enterprises.
As for the industrial sector, the public ser-
vice sector, the monopoly sector and the non-
monopoly sector were identified.1 The public
service sector includes 15 two-digit industries
in which the lion’s share of employment was
provided by administrative and civil service
institutions (xingzheng shiye danwei) that
were established with the aim of providing
public goods and services.2 The monopoly
sector refers to 17 two-digit industries in
which the market is dominated by a small
number of goods or service providers. These
industries are characterised by a high con-
centration ratio, high barriers to entry, a
lack of market competition and high mono-
poly profits. We primarily referred to Bian
and Zhang (2002) and Yue et al. (2011)’s
approaches to demarcate the monopoly
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sector. Three indicators drawn from 2004
China Economic Census Yearbook, the total
number of legal entities (faren danwei), the
average size of legal entities and the share of
total assets owned by state-owned enter-
prises, were used to adjust the classification.3
Our classification can be justified by an offi-
cial document issued by the State Council,
which demarcated the scope of monopoly
industries (State Council, 2005). Lastly, the
non-monopoly sector refers to 54 two-digit
industries characterised by a large number of
competitors, relatively low barriers to entry
and a high share of non-state investment.
As a result, five economic sectors were
identified based on the indicators of owner-
ship type and industrial sector: the public ser-
vice sector (the overlap between the state
sector and the public service sector), the
state monopoly sector (the overlap between
the state sector and the monopoly sector),
the state non-monopoly sector (the overlap
between the state sector and the non-
monopoly sector), the collective and domes-
tic private sector (the overlap between the
non-state sector and the non-monopoly sec-
tor) and the foreign-invested and other sec-
tor (the overlap between the non-state sector
and the non-monopoly sector). We lumped
together collectively owned and privately
owned domestic enterprises, partly because
many firms registered as collectively owned
firms were de facto privately owned firms in
the 2000s (Lin and Hu, 2011), and partly
because our preliminary analytical results
showed little difference between these two
ownership sectors in wage determination. In
addition, those who worked for non-state-
run civil service institutions (e.g. private
schools), non-state-owned enterprises in
monopoly industries, social and religious
organisations, international organisations
and community committees were excluded
from the analysis, because the number of
employees working in these sectors is very
small in China. The final sample includes
318,205 individuals from 320 prefectures of
31 provinces, among which 19.64 percent,
7.87 percent, 18.53 percent, 45.01 percent
and 8.95 percent of individuals are employed
in the public service sector, the state mono-
poly sector, the state non-monopoly sector,
the collective and domestic private sector
and the foreign-invested sector, respectively.
Mapping sectoral wage differentials in
China
Figures 1–4 illustrate the inter-prefecture
variability in the wage differentials between
the collective and domestic private sector
and each of the other four sectors. We
assumed that, in the extreme case, different
prefectures may have totally different wage-
setting systems and, therefore, ran a single-
level OLS regression separately for each of
the 320 prefectures (Hauser and Xie, 2005).
In these 320 regressions, the dependent vari-
able is the hourly wage, including base
wages, bonuses and subsidies, in logarithmic
form,4 and the independent variables include
four sectoral dummies and other individual-
level variables listed in the upper panel of
Table 1. Based on the results from these 320
regressions, we mapped regression coeffi-
cients for four sectoral dummies throughout
the country using the collective and domestic
private sector as reference. A coefficient of
0.1 indicates that, on average, the employees
of the public service sector (or other three
sectors) earn approximately 10 percent more
than their counterparts of the collective and
domestic private sector in the same prefec-
ture when all other individual-level variables
are controlled.
Figures 1–4 show the existence of signifi-
cant regional heterogeneity in wage differen-
tials between economic sectors. When all
other individual-level variables are con-
trolled, 276 and 284 prefectures show a sta-
tistically significant wage premium for the
public service sector and the state monopoly
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sector, respectively. Although nearly all
provinces display a wage premium for the
public service sector and the state monopoly
sector, only prefectures located in the inte-
rior region, especially Northeast China,
Northwest China, Inner Mongolia and
Yunnan, show a large wage premium for
these two sectors. Among these prefectures
are centres for petroleum extraction and
processing (e.g. Daqing and Karamay),
tobacco production (e.g. Yuxi) and the pro-
duction of electric power (e.g. Huainan).
In contrast, 223 prefectures have a
significant wage advantage for the state
non-monopoly sector, and most prefectures
with a large wage advantage for the state
non-monopoly sect are scattered across the
central and western regions. The economy
of these cities is mostly undiversified and
dependent on energy, mining and heavy
industries as such coal mining and process-
ing (e.g. Datong, Pingdingshan and Hebi),
metal ore mining (e.g. Jinchang and
Panzhihua), metallic manufacturing (e.g.
Jiayuguan, Anshan and Handan) and
machinery manufacturing (e.g. Baotou and
Anshan). Only 83 prefectures exhibit a sig-
nificant wage advantage for the foreign-
invested sector. These are mostly located in
coastal areas, especially the Pearl River
Table 1. Independent variables in the multilevel model.
Variable Description Source
Individual-level variables (Level 1)
PubServ Public service sector = 1 A
StatMon State monopoly sector = 1 A
StatNMon State non-monopoly sector = 1 A
Foreign Foreign-invested and other sector = 1 A
Collective and domestic private sector = 0
Edu Years of education A
Exp Work experience (age – years of education –7) A
Expsq Work experience squared A
Male Male = 1 A
Agric Agricultural hukou holder = 1 A
Mana Manager = 1 A
Prof Professional = 1 A
Clerk Clerk = 1 A
Manufacturing and commercial workers = 0
Prefecture-level variables (Level 2)
NSOUTP Share of industrial output produced by the non-state sector, 2005 (%,
multiplied by 100)
B
FORINV Ratio of foreign investment to GDP, 2001–2005 (yuan/yuan) B
MONOP Ratio of employment in the monopoly sector to employment in the
non-monopoly sector, 2005 (person/person)
A
FISCAL Ratio of budgetary expenditure to GDP, 2001–2005 (yuan/yuan) B
AVESIZE Average size of enterprises, total employment divided by the number of
enterprises, 2004 (in log)
C
CAPINT Capital intensity of enterprises, ratio of total assets to total
employment, 2004 (100,000 yuan per person)
C
COAST Cities located in the coastal region
Source: A, micro-data sample from 2005 Survey; B, China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, 2002–2006 (for
some prefectures, the missing values of some years were estimated through average treatment); C, Economic Census
Yearbook 2004 for all provinces other than Anhui and Guangxi (data about these two provinces are aggregate provincial
data from the China Economic Census Yearbook 2004).
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Delta, Yangtze River Delta, Bohai
Economic Rim and South Fujian. This is con-
sistent with the fact that coastal areas are more
likely than the rest of China to be home to
foreign-invested enterprises (Chen et al., 2011).
In addition, some large inland cities (e.g.
Xi’an, Chongqing, Wuhan and Changsha) and
some famous border cities (e.g. Mudanjiang
and Hulun Buir) also show a significant wage
advantage for the foreign-invested sector.
The multilevel modelling framework
We further employed the multilevel model
to quantify the effects of individual and
contextual factors on wage differentials
between economic sectors (Goldstein, 2011;
Parks, 2012; Wang, 2008).5 Two-level mod-
els were used to estimate the wage differen-
tials between the collective and domestic
private sector and each of the other four sec-
tors. The collective and domestic private sec-
tor was chosen as the reference category. In
the model, 318,205 individuals at level 1
were nested within 320 prefectures at level 2.
A level 1 equation is specified as follows:
Yij=b0j +b1jX1ij+b2jX2ij+b3jX3ij
+b4jX4ij+Rijr+ eij ð1Þ
Figure 1. Wage differentials between the public service sector (PubServ) and the collective and domestic
private sector (ColPriv).
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where Yij is the logged hourly wage of indi-
vidual i in prefecture j. X1ij, X2ij, X3ij and X4ij
are sectoral dummies representing the public
service sector, the state monopoly sector, the
state non-monopoly sector and the foreign-
invested sector, respectively, for individual i
in prefecture j, and their corresponding coef-
ficients (b1j, b2j, b3j, b4j) represent the wage
differentials between the collective and
domestic private sector and each of the other
four sectors in prefecture j. The level 1 inter-
cept (b0j) represents the average wage for the
collective and domestic private sector in pre-
fecture j. A vector of individual-level vari-
ables, Rij, along with the corresponding
coefficient r is included in the model
(Table 1). The level 1 error term is denoted
by eij. Given that the main purpose of this
study is to analyse how wage differentials
between economic sectors vary across 320
prefectures, the coefficients of four sectoral
dummies (b1j, b2j, b3j, b4j) along with the
level 1 intercept (b0j) are allowed to vary ran-
domly across prefectures (i.e. the random-
coefficient model), when all other level 1
coefficients are held fixed:
b0j = g00+Wjg0+m0j ð2Þ
b1j = g10+Wjg1+m1j ð3Þ
Figure 2. Wage differentials between the state monopoly sector (StatMon) and the collective and
domestic private sector (ColPriv).
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b2j = g20+Wjg2+m2j ð4Þ
b3j = g30+Wjg3+m3j ð5Þ
b4j = g40+Wjg4+m4j ð6Þ
Our two-level models split spatial variation
in the average wage for the collective and
domestic private sector and inter-sectoral
wage gaps into fixed and random compo-
nents. For the fixed part, a vector of
prefecture-level variables, Wj, along with
their associated coefficients, g0, g1, g2, g3,
g4, is included (Table 1). The vector of coef-
ficients, g1, g2, g3, g4, captures the effects of
prefecture-level factors on the relationship
between sectors and logged hourly wages and,
consequently, should be understood as the
coefficients of interaction terms. For example,
a positive g1 for FISCAL indicates a larger
wage premium for the public service sector in
areas with a higher ratio of fiscal expenditure
to GDP. For the random part, the level 2
error terms, m0j, m1j, m2j, m3j, m4j, account for
the unmeasured between-prefecture variability
in the average wage for the collective and
domestic private sector and the wage differen-
tials between the collective and domestic pri-
vate sector and each of the other four sectors.
Figure 3. Wage differentials between the state non-monopoly sector (StatNMon) and the collective and
domestic private sector (ColPriv).
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As for prefecture-level variables, two vari-
ables were used as a proxy for market expan-
sion. The share of industrial output
produced by the non-state sector (NSOUTP)
was used to measure the degree of ownership
diversity, and a high value of NSOUTP indi-
cates a full market penetration in the scope
of production activities (Fan et al., 2010).
The ratio of foreign investment to GDP
(FORINV) was employed to capture the
degree of foreign openness, and a high value
of FORINV denotes a high degree of globa-
lisation and a high level of openness to for-
eign capital (Fan et al., 2010).
Two variables were used as a proxy for
state intervention. The ratio of employment in
monopoly industries to employment in non-
monopoly industries (MONOP) was used as
a proxy for the state control over industries,
and a high value of MONOP means stringent
state regulations (Bian and Zhang, 2002; Yue
et al., 2011). The ratio of fiscal expenditure to
GDP (FISCAL) was intended to measure the
redistributive power of the state, and a high
value of FISCAL denotes a strong govern-
ment distribution power (Fan et al., 2010).
In addition, three controlled variables
were included in the models. First, given
Figure 4. Wage differentials between the foreign-invested sector (Foreign) and the collective and
domestic private sector (ColPriv).
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that large-sized firms tend to pay higher
wages than small-sized firms (Chen et al.,
2011), we used the average size of enterprises
(AVESIZE) to capture the effect of econo-
mies of scale. Second, given that capital-
intensive firms tend to offer higher wages
than labour-intensive firms (Chen et al.,
2011), we used the regional level of fixed
assets per employee (CAPINT) as a proxy
for capital intensity. Third, we included a
regional dummy (COAST) in the models to
control for unobservable location-related
factors (Chen et al., 2005; De´murger et al.,
2012).
Results
Table 2 presents the results for the multilevel
models specified in equations 1–6. In terms
of model adequacy, a likelihood ratio
test and a comparison of the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) between three
models suggest that adding sectoral dum-
mies and prefecture-level variables can sig-
nificantly increase the explanatory power of
the models. We firstly construct a model
with individual-level variables other than
four sectoral dummies (Model 0). All
individual-level controlled variables are sta-
tistically significant and display expected
signs. Given that the focus of this article is
on how regional variations in market expan-
sion and state intervention influence wage
inequality across sectors, the coefficients of
individual-level controls are not discussed
any further in this article.
Model 1 includes not only individual-level
controls but also four sectoral dummies. The
coefficients of g10, g20, g30 and g40 represent
the weighted grand mean of wage differen-
tials between the collective and domestic pri-
vate sector and each of other four sectors
across 320 prefectures. On average, the aver-
age wages of the public service sector, the
state monopoly sector, the state non-
monopoly sector and the foreign-invested
sector are about 19.2 percent, 29.4 percent,
13.8 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively,
higher than that of the collective and domes-
tic private sector.
Model 2 includes not only all individual-
level variables but also prefecture-level vari-
ables. When prefecture-level variables are
added to Model 1, the wage premium of
state sectors decreases, and the wage pre-
mium of the foreign-invested sector
increases. As shown in Model 2, the average
wages of the public service sector, the state
monopoly sector, the state non-monopoly
sector and the foreign-invested sector are
about 16.8 percent, 25.7 percent, 9.6 percent
and 10.6 percent, respectively, higher than
that of the collective and domestic private
sector. This study particularly focuses on the
coefficients for prefecture-level variables and
their interaction terms with four sectoral
dummies. The coefficients associated with
NSOUTP and FORINV support our
Hypothesis 1 that the relative wage of non-
state-sector employees is higher in areas with
a higher level of market growth. Specifically,
a one-percent increase in the NSOUTP
results in a decrease in the hourly wage for
the public service sector, the state monopoly
sector and the state non-monopoly sector by
about 0.25 percent, 0.18 percent and 0.28
percent, respectively, relative to that for
non-state sectors.6 A one-unit increase in the
FORINV results in an increase in the hourly
wage for the foreign-invested sector by
about 45.9 percent relative to that for other
sectors. Overall, the diversity in ownership
forms particularly affects the wage gap
between the state and non-state sectors,
while the openness to foreign investment
particularly influences the wage differentials
between the domestic-invested and foreign-
invested sectors.
The coefficients related to MONOP con-
firm our Hypothesis 2 that a stringent regu-
lation of the government on industries
increases the wage premium in the state
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monopoly sector. Specifically, a one-unit
increase in the MONOP causes an increase
in the hourly wage for the state monopoly
sector, the state non- monopoly sector and
the foreign-invested sector by about 46.9
percent, 18.3 percent and 21.0 percent,
respectively, relative to that for the collective
and domestic private sector. This finding
suggests that the wage gap between the state
monopoly sector and the non-monopoly sec-
tor increases with more government regula-
tion. The coefficients related to FISCAL
support our Hypothesis 3 that the wage pre-
mium in the public service sector is higher in
areas with stronger redistributive power.
Specifically, a one-unit increase in the
FISCAL results in an increase in the hourly
wage for the public service sector by about
92.3 percent relative to that for other
sectors.
As for the control variables related to
general firm characteristics, the wage differ-
entials between the collective and domestic
private sector and other sectors are not
influenced by the change in the average size
of enterprises (AVESIZE). A one-unit
increase in the degree of capital intensity of
enterprises (CAPINT) results in an increase
in the hourly wage for the public service sec-
tor, the state monopoly sector and the
foreign-invested sector by 1.1 percent, 0.8
percent and 0.6 percent, respectively, relative
to other sectors. In addition, prefectures
located in coastal provinces (COAST) rela-
tive to those located in the central and west-
ern regions tend to display a higher hourly
wage in the state sectors relative to the non-
state sectors.
Discussion and conclusion
Using the 2005 Survey data and multilevel
models, this article has examined the geo-
graphic variability of wage differentials
between economic sectors in urban China.
The results from single-level regressions for
each of 320 prefectures have indicated that
sectoral wage differentials vary substantially
across regions. More specifically, prefectures
located in the interior region tend to exhibit
a large wage premium for the state sectors,
while prefectures located in the coastal
region tend to display a wage advantage for
the foreign-invested sector. The results from
multilevel models have shown that market
expansion interacts with state intervention to
reconfigure earnings outcomes: the wage gap
between the state and non-state sectors is
smaller in areas with diversified ownership;
openness to foreign investment increases the
relative wages for the foreign-invested sector;
stringent government regulation of industries
increases the wage gap between the state
monopoly sector and the non-monopoly sec-
tors; and strong redistributive power
increases the wage premium for the public
service sector over other sectors.
This article makes conceptual and empiri-
cal contributions to the study of wage
inequality across economic sectors in urban
China. Conceptually, it has incorporated
both ownership segmentation and administra-
tive monopoly into the framework of wage
inequality across sectors, and empirically, it
has proposed a new approach to classify
Chinese economic sectors in recent years.
Our findings have shown that employees in
the state monopoly sector earn much higher
than those in both state and non-state non-
monopoly sectors, and that the wage pre-
mium for the state monopoly sector over
non-monopoly sectors is determined primar-
ily by government regulations on industries,
when all other prefecture- and individual-
level variables are controlled. Therefore, we
attribute the rising earnings inequality in
recent years partly to the combination effect
of ownership segmentation and administrative
monopoly. It should be noted that our wage
data contain respondents’ earnings including
wages, bonuses and subsidies, but hidden
income and employee benefits may not be
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reported. This may cause an underestimate
of income gaps between the state sector and
the non-state sector, since workers in the
state sector have more opportunities to reap
hidden income and enjoy more favourable
benefits than their counterparts in the non-
state sector (Xie and Wu, 2008).
This study goes beyond the existing litera-
ture by examining the effect of market trans-
formation on wage differentials between
sectors within a multifaceted and multilevel
framework. Rather than focusing exclusively
on the role played by seemingly irresistible
market penetration, we have viewed market
expansion and state transformation as two
separate but interrelated processes. The
empirical evidence of this article has indi-
cated that sectoral wage differentials in China
are mediated by not only market expansion
but also state intervention, and that these two
forces contribute to regional variations in
wage inequality in China. Our findings have
not only supported Bian and Zhang’s (2002)
assumption that China’s state has trans-
formed its role from a redistributive state to a
regulative state in response to the expansion
of market, but have also quantitatively mea-
sured the extent to which both redistributive
power (proxied by government spending) and
regulatory power (proxied by the administra-
tive protections of state monopolistic enter-
prises) influence earnings inequality.
Furthermore, our findings support the
assumption made by some economic geogra-
phers that labour markets are spatially con-
stituted and locally contingent, and that an
individual’s employment outcome is not
only determined by his/her personal attri-
butes but also influenced by local labour
market conditions (Parks, 2012; Peck, 1996).
Little research has so far been done on del-
ving into the impact of local conditions on
labour market outcomes in the Chinese con-
text, with a few exceptions such as Xu et al.
(2006) and Chen (2011). Consequently, there
is a great need to take into account
contextually constituted and locally specific
wage-setting mechanisms when studying
China’s wage inequality.
Although our conclusion is based on sur-
vey data collected in 2005, the situation
regarding to the wage premium of public
and state monopoly sectors and heavy state
involvement in economic affairs is still
ongoing in the mid-2010s. First, strategic
industries such as petroleum extraction,
tobacco, State Grid and telecommunication
were still firmly in the hand of the state, and
in some capital-intensive industries such as
coal mining and real estate which were once
open to all private investors, state-owned
enterprises strengthened their dominance in
the market through acquisitions and mergers
(as Wines (2010) put it, ‘the state sector
advances, and the private sector retreats’).
Second, state-owned enterprises benefitted
more from the Chinese government’s stimu-
lus package than their privately owned
counterparts in recent years. For example,
the Chinese government launched a large sti-
mulus plan in 2008–2010 to combat the glo-
bal financial crisis, yet this stimulus plan
resulted in a surge of investment and bank
loans in the state sector (Johansson and Feng,
2015). Third, the wage advantages of state
monopoly sectors over private sectors remain
apparent in the mid-2010s, as state-owned
monopoly enterprises still reap excessive prof-
its through scale economies, price manipula-
tion and administrative protection. Therefore,
research findings from this study are still valu-
able to the understanding of the more recent
situation of Chinese labour markets.
It should be noted that this exploratory
study merely focuses on the impact of mar-
ket transformation, instead of a comprehen-
sive set of contextual factors, on wage
inequality in China. The next step of our
research is to incorporate more macro-level
structural factors such as industrial mix,
labour force composition and macroeco-
nomic policies into the analysis and to
Liu et al. 17
 at University of St Andrews on August 30, 2016usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
investigate the geographic variability of
wage inequality by gender, class and the
rural-urban divide. Another limitation of
this study is that the estimation of our mul-
tilevel models might be biased by the pres-
ence of unobserved heterogeneity (i.e.
variables related to individual characteris-
tics that are unobserved but correlated with
observed variables). For example, an indi-
vidual’s possibility of entering the public
and state monopoly sectors is likely to be
influenced by his/her social capital and
political capital, which are not observed
due to the limitation of the data. Failing to
address this problem will cause an upward
bias in the coefficients of the public and
state monopoly sectors. Future research on
wage inequality in China is needed to
address the issue of unobserved heteroge-
neity based on higher quality data and
more advanced econometric techniques
such as instrumental variables methods
and Heckman correction for selection bias.
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Notes
1. The public service sector includes scientific
research (75); scientific and technological
exchange (77); geological prospecting (78);
management of water conservancy, environ-
ment and public facilities (79–81); education
(84); health care, social security and social
welfare (85–87); broadcasting, television,
film, sound recording and video (89); culture
and art (90); sport (91); party agencies (93);
and government agencies (94). The monopoly
sector includes petroleum and gas extraction
(07); tobacco products (16); petroleum pro-
cessing, coking and nuclear fuel processing
(25); production and supply of electric power,
gas and water (44–46); railway, waterway, air
and pipeline transportation (51, 54–56); posts
and communications (59); telecommunica-
tions and other information transmission ser-
vices (60); finance (68–71); and press and
publishing (88). The non-monopoly sector
includes mining and quarrying (except petro-
leum and gas) (06, 08–11); manufacturing
(except tobacco, petroleum and nuclear fuel)
(13–15, 17–24, 26–43); construction (47–50);
interurban ground transportation (52); urban
transportation (53); handling and other sup-
port activities for transportation (57); ware-
housing and storage (58); computer services
(61); software industry (62); wholesale and
retailing (63, 65); accommodation and cater-
ing (66, 67); real estate (72); rental and leasing
(73); business services (74); technical service
(76); resident services and other services (82,
83); and entertainment and recreation (92).
Two-digit industry codes are listed in
parentheses.
2. For example, the 2004 China Economic census
yearbook reports that the administrative and
civil service institutions accounted for between
57 percent and 100 percent of employment in
any of these 15 two-digit industries.
3. We ruled out from the list of monopoly indus-
tries those with a very large number of legal
entities such as coal mining (. 10,000), a very
small average size of legal entities such as fer-
rous ore mining (\ 100) or a low share of
state-owned enterprises such as business ser-
vices (\ 50%).
4. In the 2005 Survey, respondents were
required to report their monthly earnings
from labour last month (ME) and the num-
ber of working hours last week (WH). In this
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study, we calculated the hourly wage (HW)
as HW = ME/(WH 3 4), assuming that the
respondent works four weeks a month.
5. Some scholars may argue that sample selec-
tion bias possibly arises when using conven-
tional regression techniques to analyse
sectoral wage differentials, because workers
self-select into different sectors and workers’
unobserved individual characteristics affect
not only the sector choice but also the wage
level (Song, 2015). For example, workers with
more social resources and better political con-
nections are more likely to be employed in the
public and monopoly state sectors. This will
lead to bias in the estimated coefficients of sec-
tor dummies and measurement errors in the
dependent variable. One solution is to use
Heckman’s two-step approach to estimate a
sector-selection equation. However, our dataset
does not contain variables that determine the
sector choice (for example, the way of obtaining
jobs, social networks and Communist Party
membership). Therefore, while acknowledging
the possibility of bias, we did not correct for
sample selection bias in our analysis.
6. Note that the results are further divided by 100,
because data regarding NSOUTP have been
multiplied by 100 to reduce decimal places.
References
Bian Y and Zhang Z (2002) Marketization and
income distribution in urban China, 1988 and
1995. Research in Social Stratification and
Mobility 19: 377–415.
Cao Y and Nee VG (2000) Comment: Controver-
sies and evidence in the market transition
debate. American Journal of Sociology 105(4):
1175–1189.
Chan HS and Ma J (2011) How are they paid? A
study of civil service pay in China. Interna-
tional Review of Administrative Sciences 77(2):
294–321.
Chen Y (2011) Occupational attainment of
migrants and local workers: Findings from a
survey in Shanghai’s manufacturing sector.
Urban Studies 48(1): 3–21.
Chen Y, De´murger S and Fournier M (2005)
Earnings differentials and ownership structure
in Chinese enterprises. Economic Development
and Cultural Change 53(4): 933–958.
Chen ZH, Ge Y and Lai HW (2011) Foreign
direct investment and wage inequality: Evi-
dence from China. World Development 39(8):
1322–1332.
De´murger S, Li S and Yang J (2012) Earnings
differentials between the public and private
sectors in China: Exploring changes for urban
local residents in the 2000s. China Economic
Review 23(1): 138–153.
Fan G, Wang X and Zhu H (2010) National Eco-
nomic Research Institute Index of Marketiza-
tion of China’s Provinces. Beijing: Economic
Science Press.
Goldstein H (2011) Multilevel Statistical Models.
4th edition. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons
Ltd.
Hauser SM and Xie Y (2005) Temporal and
regional variation in earnings inequality:
Urban China in transition between 1988 and
1995. Social Science Research 34(1): 44–79.
He C, Wei Y and Pan F (2007) Geographical
concentration of manufacturing industries in
China: The importance of spatial and indus-
trial scales. Eurasian Geography and Econom-
ics 48(5): 603–625.
Hu FZY and Lin GCS (2011) Situating regional
advantage in geographical political economy:
Transformation of the state-owned enterprises
in Guangzhou, China. Geoforum 42(6):
696–707.
Hu FZY and Lin GCS (2013) Placing the trans-
formation of state-owned enterprises in north-
east China: The state, region and firm in a
transitional economy. Regional Studies 47(4):
563–579.
Johansson AC and Feng X (2015) The state
advances, the private sector retreats? Firm
effects of China’s great stimulus programme.
Cambridge Journal of Economics. DOI:
10.1093/cje/bev075.
Li S and Sicular T (2014) The distribution of
household income in China: Inequality, pov-
erty and policies. The China Quarterly 217:
1–41.
Lin GCS and Hu FZY (2011) Getting the China
story right: Insights from national economic
censuses. Eurasian Geography and Economics
52(5): 712–746.
Liu T and Lin GCS (2014) New geography of
land commodification in Chinese cities:
Liu et al. 19
 at University of St Andrews on August 30, 2016usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Uneven landscape of urban land development
under market reforms and globalization.
Applied Geography 51: 118–130.
Meng X (2012) Labor market outcomes and
reforms in China. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 26(4): 75–101.
Naughton BJ (2006) The Chinese Economy: Tran-
sitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
Nee V (1989) A theory of market transition: From
redistribution to markets in state socialism.
American Sociological Review 54(5): 663–681.
Nee V and Cao Y (2005) Market transition and
the firm: Institutional change and income
inequality in urban China. Management and
Organization Review 1(1): 23–56.
Parks V (2012) The uneven geography of racial
and ethnic wage inequality: Specifying local
labor market effects. Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 102(3): 700–725.
Peck JA (1996) Work-Place: The Social Regula-
tion of Labor Markets. New York: Guilford
Press.
Poon JPH and Shang QY (2012) Regional wage
inequality in China, 1996–2010. Eurasian Geo-
graphy and Economics 53(3): 338–355.
Shu X, Zhu Y and Zhang Z (2007) Global econ-
omy and gender inequalities: The case of the
urban Chinese labor market. Social Science
Quarterly 88(5): 1307–1332.
Song Y (2015) Hukou-based labour market dis-
crimination and ownership structure in urban
China. Urban Studies 53(8): 1657–1673.
State Council (2005) Several opinions of the state
council on encouraging, supporting and guid-
ing the development of individual and private
economy and other non-public sectors of the
economy. Beijing: Limited Partners Associa-
tion of China. Available at: http://www.lpacn.
com/news/details.aspx?id=2010613110643.
Walder AG (2002) Markets and income inequal-
ity in rural China: Political advantage in an
expanding economy. American Sociological
Review 67(2): 231–253.
Wang QF (2008) Race/ethnicity, gender and job
earnings across metropolitan areas in the
United States: A multilevel analysis. Urban
Studies 45(4): 825–843.
Wei YHD (2004) Trajectories of ownership trans-
formation in China: Implications for uneven
regional development. Eurasian Geography and
Economics 45(2): 90–113.
Wei YHD (2007) Regional development in China:
Transitional institutions, embedded globaliza-
tion, and hybrid economies. Eurasian Geogra-
phy and Economics 48(1): 16–36.
Wines M (2010) China fortifies state businesses to
fuel growth. The New York Times, 29 August.
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
08/30/world/asia/30china.html?_r=0.
Wong C (2009) Rebuilding government for the
21st century: Can China incrementally reform
the public sector? China Quarterly 200:
929–952.
Xie Y and Hannum E (1996) Regional variation
in earnings inequality in reform-era urban
China. American Journal of Sociology 101(4):
950–992.
Xie Y and Wu XG (2008) Danwei profitability
and earnings inequality in urban China. China
Quarterly 195: 558–581.
Xie Y and Zhou X (2014) Income inequality in
today’s China. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 111(19): 6928–6933.
Xu W, Tan KC and Wang GX (2006) Segmented
local labor markets in postreform China: Gen-
der earnings inequality in the case of two
towns in Zhejiang province. Environment and
Planning A 38(1): 85–109.
Yue X, Li S and Sicular T (2011) High incomes
in monopoly industries: A discussion. Social
Sciences in China 32(2): 178–196.
Zhang W and Bao S (2015) Created unequal: Chi-
na’s regional pay inequality and its relation-
ship with mega-trend urbanization. Applied
Geography 61: 81–93.
Zhou X (2000) Economic transformation and
income inequality in urban china: Evidence
from panel data. American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 105(4): 1135–1174.
20 Urban Studies
 at University of St Andrews on August 30, 2016usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
